INTRODUCTION
State and local "economic development programs"-programs that assist individual businesses with tax or financial subsidies, or special public services, in order to increase local jobs or improve local businesses' competitiveness-have become prominent and controversial. I receive several phone calls a month from reporters about the latest round in the state subsidy wars-such as Alabama's 1993 subsidies of $250 million for a new Mercedes plant, or South Carolina's 1992 subsidy package of $100 million for a new BMW plant. (Schweke, Rist, and Dabson, 1994, p. 23) . The reporters seem most interested in criticisms that this is a waste of government resources. Is economic development, as argued by the Illinois Tax Foundation, "the newest form of pork"? (Ylisela and Conn, 1990 Can economics research say anything useful about whether economic development policies can be effective? My answer is yes. Economics research suggests that traditional economic development policies of "buying growth," using various financial and tax subsidies, have a high cost per job created. Benefits large enough to justify such costs are more likely in economically distressed areas, in which the unemployed are more desperate for jobs and much of the existing public infrastructure is underutilized. Newer economic development policies, which provide services to enhance business productivity, may improve economic efficiency, but need careful evaluation. Such productivity-oriented services may make sense for low unemployment as well as high unemployment areas.
cal research on how local economic growth responds to taxes, and how local growth affects local labor markets. Third, there are several recent studies on the effectiveness of specific economic development programs.
WHAT ARE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS TODAY?
Most of the public resources for economic development go to tax subsidies and other financial subsidies to encourage firms to locate or expand in a particular governmental jurisdiction. Examples of such subsidies include: propertytax abaternents; low-Interest loans; tax exempt bonds to finance business expansion; wage subsidies; free land and infrastructure.
Reliable statistics on these subsidies are rare. Data on the magnitude of economic development tax expenditures are only available for three states: Michigan, New York, and Louisiana. In Michigan, annual revenue foregone through property-tax abatements exceeds $150 million, over $16 per capita (Citizens Research Council, 1986) . In New York State, state and local tax breaks promoting economic development exceed $500 million annually, over $27 per capita (Regan, 1988) . In Louisiana, industrial business property-tax exemptions cost over $270 million annually, over $60 per capita. (Schweke, Rist, and Dabson, 1994) .
These tax expenditures vastly exceed government spending for economic development. Surveys indicate that annual city government spending for economic development averages around $3 per capita (National Council for Urban Economic Development, 199 1; Poole, Kennedy, and Butler, 1993) . Total state economic development agency spending in the United States is around $1.3 billion annually, around $5 per capita (National Association of State Development Agencies, 1992) . Some government spending for economic development also is devoted to financial subtidies for business location or expansion.
This emphasis on tax breaks for large new facilitres and expansions has a strong Ipolitical rationale. A ribbon cutting at a new plant or plant expansion attracts attention. Providing a tax break allows a governor or mayor to take credit for good news. Much of the cost of this tax break may ibe deferred to the future.
State and local efforts to buy growth have intensified over time. For example, Kentucky in 1988 began a 6 percent wage subsidy program for new firms locating in high unempl~oyment counties. Kentucky has since expanded the geographic scope of this program. Kentucky's aggressive wage subsidy has been imitated by Ohio, Oklahoma, Mississippi, and Alabama ' (Schweke, Rist, and Dabson, 1994, pp. 14, 38) .
Although the spotlight is on "smokestack chasing," many estate and local governments, since th early 198Os, have devoted resourc ,' s to a new appreach to economic d&elopment, which emphasizes providing C ustomized services to help businesses improve their competitiveness. Such "new wave services" include: providilng businesses with advice and technical assistance on modernization options; he ping businesses figure out how to ex d ort; helping businesses with worker training; helping potential entrepreneurs and small businesses develop better ~business plans and locate financing. Such~ services are usually focused on small and medium sized businesses, which hav the greatest needs for such E service . Examples of "new wave" services include the following.
( MARKET FAILURE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS As Courant discusses in his article in this symposium, economists have a welldeveloped philosophy about when government should intervene to affect local job growth. Economists presume that government should not intervene unless job growth is "mispriced" because of "market failure," the failure of private markets to work efficiently. In a perfectly efficient world, when an additional job is created, the worker in that job is paid wages equal to the value he or she places on their time in their alternative activities if that job had not been created-e.g., child care, looking for another job, attending school or training programs, leisure. In addition, in this imaginary perfectly efficient world, the new job will generate tax revenues exactly equal to the additional roads, public schools, and other public services associated with this job growth. In the real world, job growth may often be "mispriced" in that its benefits and costs are unbalanced-workers may be substantially better off from becoming employed, and state and local governments may receive fiscal benefits or costs from additional job growth.
Additional job growth is more likely to have social benefits in persistently high unemployment, economically declining areas. In high unemployment areas, many unemployed individuals will be desperate for a job, but unable to obtain one. These individuals will receive substantial benefits from obtaining the jobs provided by growth. In low unemployment areas, most IIndividuals who desperately want a job can obtain one without additional job growth. The remaining unemployed vvill on average be less intense in their desire for a job. The benefit from employing such individuals in the jobs provided by growth will be less.'
Areas that have declined in employment and population will also have greater fiscal benefits from job growth. Such areas will have underutilized public infrastructure and services. Adding jobs or preventing further decline may require little additional public spending. In rapidly growing areas, additional job growth will require investments in roads, schools, and other infrastructure. Case studies have indicated that such infrastructure costs often exceed the tax revenues from new job growth. For example, a 1989 study of Montgomery County, Maryland indicated that each new office job produced county revenues per year of $410, whereas the new highways required for that job would cost $347. Altshuler and Gomez-lbanez comment that "with such a slim margin, little tax revenue was left over to fund other county services that the office building might require (such as sewer, water, solid waste, police protection, or fire protection), let alone those required by the households of employees" (AItshuler and Gomez-lbanez, 1993, p. 85 ).
There may also be a "market failure" rationale for government intervention to provide "new wave" economic development services, which target the productivity of small and me/ciium-sized businesses. Private markeqs in information and training are impe feet. Such irnperfections may impede e roductivity growth. Small businesses and potential entrepreneurs may ha, e inadequate training in starting up and managing a business. Small and Tedium-sized business may not know e/lough about their options in technology4 worker training, and exporting. Small l)usinesses may also underinvest in worker, training because of worker turnover.
There are private mar ets in information and training--consult nts for example. But information is a " p culiar commodity because it is difficult $0 evaluate the quality of information~ before one has consumed It. Uncertai ty about quality may inefficiently restri : t demand. In addition, training for m nagers and workers may sometimes b difficult to finance.
Claiming a "failure" ih markets in information and training f r small and medium-sized busines K es does not justify every government-spo sored service that claims to correct thes problems. Maybe some firms that lack i formation deserve to fail. Propping these firms up with free services would be a c istake. In addition, such programs face t h e challenge of providirlg services tha d firms value. Providing such services t firms is only efficient if the value of ttie information and training exceeds the costs of these services. Evaluating whet er this is the case is important. h The nature of the pot ntial market failure in information an training markets suggests that firms sh 1 uld be required to pay for some of th costs of such services,. rather than b ing given free services If the service his valuable, the firm should be willing to pay part of the costs. Fees also help s retch t limited publit dollars further. A given public budget I SYMPOSIUM ON STATE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY for economic development can then support services to more firms.
GEOGRAPHIC SPILLOVERS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
Another standard "welfare economics" issue for any state or local government policy, including economic development, is what are the spillover effects or "externalities" on other states or local areas. For state and local policies that buy job growth, the success of one area causes negative externalities for other areas. Extra job growth in one local area will in part (not necessarily totally) come at the expense of reduced job growth in other local areas.' This tradeoff is obvious when two states are competing for a Mercedes plant. But even when a state or local area attracts small business growth, that additional growth will usually reduce the sales of businesses located elsewhere, hurting their job growth.
These negative externalities reduce the national economic benefits of local competition for jobs. But even if national employment is unaffected, there may still be some net national benefits-or costs-of local competition for jobs. Net national benefits are more likely if the local areas that most aggressively "buy growth" are high unemployment areas. Even though greater job growth in high unemployment areas comes at the expense of low unemployment areas, this redistribution of jobs will yield net employment and fiscal benefits. The extra jobs in high unemployment areas will go to individuals who desperately need jobs, whereas the reduced jobs in low unemployment areas will be taken away from individuals who could easily obtain a job anyway. Reallocating growth from booming areas to declining areas allows greater use of existing infrastructure, and less spending on new infrastructure.
In contrast, if low unemployment, booming areas are the most aggressive in "buying growth," job competition will have net national costs. Redistributing jobs from declining to booming areas will take jobs away from individuals who desperately need jobs, and provide jobs for individuals who could have obtained jobs anyway. This redistribution will also require more infrastructure spending.
Because the benefits of extra growth are lower for already booming areas, one could argue that high growth areas will not aggressively pursue growth. But political and economic elites may have strong private reasons for preferring progrowth policies. Greater job growth will increase land prices and the prices charged by firms serving local markets (Bartik, 1991 a).3 Local banks, newspapers, and real estate developers will benefit from growth and have political clout (Logan and Molotch, 1987) .
Economic development
policies that enhance business productivity may also increase the efficiency of the national economy. Consumers throughout the nation benefit if businesses in one area can provide better-quality products at a lower price.
One might mistakenly think that improving local business productivity lacks national benefits because a more productive local economy will attract business activity from other local areas. But reallocating resources toward more productive uses increases national economic efficiency. Business competition also can appear to lack national benefits, because some businesses lose. For example, if Gateway Computers develops a cheaper way to make higher quality computers, it will take sales away from Compaq, but there would be net benefits even if total computer sales are unchanged. Reallocating resources toward better, cheaper computers enhances economic efficiency. Similarly, if Pittsburgh economic development agencies do a better job than Milwaukee agencies in improving the productivity of local small businesses, and as a result economic activity shifts from Milwaukee to Pittsburgh, this increases national economic efficiency.
JOBS TO PEOPLE VERSUS PEOPLE TO JOBS
I have argued that one rationale for local economic development policies in high unemployment areas is that such policies bring jobs to the persons who most need them. An alternative to bringing jobs to people is bringing people to jobs. Is promoting economic development in high unemployment areas preferable to encouraging unemployed workers to move to Io'w unemployment areas?
It makes sense to give unemployed workers better information on job opportunities In other citres and states. But if workers have or are given good information, it is unclear that subsidizing them to move makes sense. Workers suffer large psychological costs from moving out of their home labor market, with its familiar people and places (Bartik, 1991 a, pp. 6*4-66) . If workers know the alternatives but reject moving, a policy of subsidizing workers to move seems unduly paternalistic.
Subsidizing firms to provide jobs in high unemployment areas also distorts a particular type of location decision, those of businesses rather than workers. But in this case we are subsidizing firms in order to have them recognize the effects of their job creation on another group, unemployed workers. This is different from subsidizing someone to change their behavior for their own good. There is uncertainty in this cost estimate. Some studies show greater tax effects on location decisions, whereas other studies show no effects whatsoever. As Courant points out in his article in this symposium, the costs per job created may vary from one local economy to another. We could provide better policy advice if we had more precise estimates of the effects of specific tax incentives in different local economies.
But despite the uncertainty, most evidence is consistent with the belief that economic development subsidies, in most state or metropolitan areas, are likely to have significant costs per job created in a metropolitan area. Contrary to some claims, tax and financial incentives are not a free lunch for a state or metropolitan area. These programs do not create enough jobs and new tax revenue that the programs have little or no net cost. Some states or metropolitan areas may perceive sufficient benefits from new jobs that a $4,000 annual cost of creating a new job could seem reasonable. But this cost is high enough that a state or metropolitan area should think carefully about whether aggressively using tax subsidies to attract new business activity will have net benefits.
Another implication of this research is that small communities within metropolitan areas may be tempted to engage in incentive wars, with little net benefit to the metropolitan area. If a 10 percent reduction in a community's business property tax rates increases local business activity by 20 percent, then a community can raise revenue by lowering business property taxes--if no other community in the metropolitan area responds by lowering itq property taxes. In the real world, other communities in the metropolitan area will ~ respond. Communities will lose more t;ix revenue and gain fewer jobs then t/hey initially expected.
RESEARCH ON EFFECTS OF JOB GROWTH ON LOCAL LABOR MARKETS
There is much evidencie that stronger local ,job growth has sig' r ificant long-run labor market benefits or local residents. A 10 percent increaseIin jobs in a metropolitan area in the l$ng run increases local employment rates by 2 percent. To put it another way, in the long run, around one in five of the new jobs created go to the original local residents, and the other four golto in-migrants. A 10 percent increase in ~ metropolntan employment also increas& long-run real wages in the metropo/itan area by around 2 percent. This increase in real wages occurs because individuals in a growing local economy are able to get and keep jobs in high tions. (See Bartik, 199 and estiimates, and 3 r-paying occupaa for a review Ba ,tik, 1993c for more relzent evidence.)
Local residents are able to sustain these real income gains in the long run even though local job growth leads to significant in-migration.
In t h e short run, with limited in-migration, loical residents are able because of growth to obtain jobs they otherwise would pot have obtained. These jobs proyide job skills. Because of these job skill/s, local residents are permanently betteri off because of a one-time surge in locali job growth.
The percentage increaye in income from local job growth is greater for disadvantaged groups. High school dropouts gain more than college graduates, AfricanAmericans gain more tlhan whites, and the lowest-Income quidtile families gain more than the average family (Bartik, 1991a (Bartik, , 1993a (Bartik, , 1994 . A worker's labor market fortunes are more affected by the job growth of his or her metropolitan area than the job growth of the particular city or county in which the worker resides (Bartik, 1993b) . Metropolitan areas are the best definition of a "labor market," within which job-related opportunities tend to equalize for similar individuals.
The benefits of metropolitan job growth are significantly greater for jobs with a high wage premium, that is jobs that pay well relative to the skills required (Bartik, 1993b (Bartik, , 1994 .7 A shift in a metropolitan area's industry mix toward higher-wage-premium industries not only increases wages, but also increases labor force participation.
RESEARCH ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS TO IMPROVE PRODUCTIVITY
There have been few evaluations of economic development programs that seek to improve business productivity. Those evaluations that have been done, however, suggest that such programs can be effective.
Several studies suggest that industrial extension services and small business development centers, which provide businesses with information and training about modernization, exporting, worker training, or management, can be helpful. A survey of business clients of Ohio's Edison Technology Center Program found that one-third of the businesses believed that assistance from the Edison program had helped them to increase sales, profits, market share, or employment (Mt. Auburn Associates, 1992) . A survey of business clients of Pennsylvania's Industrial Resource Center program found that 20 percent of the businesses reported increased revenue because of the program, and almost half reported cost reductions due to the program (KPMG Peat Marwick, 1993) . A survey of clients of Oregon's Small Business Development Center program found that one-fourth believed that the program had greatly increased their profits (Public Policy Associates, 1992) .
A word on evaluation methodology. Economists are suspicious that survey respondents may lie about their evaluations. But several features of these surveys and programs suggest that these evaluations are reliable. There is no requirement that businesses must claim services were essential in order to get the service. Furthermore, if the service was useless, what is the incentive for businesses to claim it was useful? These surveys allowed respondents to be anonymous. Finally, both the Ohio and Oregon evaluations supplemented surveys with business focus groups, which confirmed the survey results.
Surveys of clients of business assistance programs can be helpful with program design if different programs are evaluated using the same survey. Survey results from different programs can be compared to see which approach is most effective.
Comparisons of surveys suggest that business information programs are more effective when programs are locally run, with extensive business involvement. For example, the most effective Edison Centers are those with extensive business influence over program design, whereas those Centers dominated by university administrators get lower ratings from their business clients. In Oregon, the 19 locally run Small Business Development Centers were more highly rated by business clients than Oregon's other small business service programs, which delivered services through a single state office.
A recent study suggests that entrepreneurial training programs can signifi-cantly increase the rate at which potential entrepreneurs start up new businesses. The U.S. Labor Department has sponsored experiments in the states of Washington and Massachusetts in entrepreneurial training for unemployment insurance recipients. In these experiments, UI recipients interested in entrepreneurship were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups. The treatment groups received training and ass/stance in developing a business plan, and a lump-sum payment of their remaining UI benefits if they achieved business planning goals. In Massachusetts, 47 percent of the treatment group entered self-employment, compared to 29 percent of the controls, whereas in Washington State, 52 percent of the treatment group entered self-employment, compared to 27 percent of the controls (Benus, Wood, anld Grover, 1994).
Another study inclicates that customized job training assistance can improve business productivity (Holzer et al., 1993) . Holzer et a/. evaluated Michlgan's industrial training grant program for manufacturing firms undergoing modernization. The evaluation compared firms that received training grants with firms that applied for grants too late in the fiscal year. The state program awarded grants on a "first come-first serve" basis to all firms that met eligibility criteria. Holzer et al. found that firms that received grants did more job training afterwards than nongrantees, and their product scrappage rates declined more. Product scrappage rates decline'd enough that the training seemed cost-effective. A key issue is why firms did not pursue such training on iheir own.
Holzer's study could be criticized on the grounds that firms that applied too late for grants may also be less capable in other ways. This criticism is not supported by the dat(a, which suggest that assisted simtlar. and unassisted firms were quite CONCLUSION: ADVICfl TO POLICYMAKERS To summarize the implications of research for economic d e velopment policy, I will conclude with t4o memos: one to a governor or mayor, the other to the President.
To: Governor or Mayqr of Jurisdiction X. Re: three things you clan do to improve your junsdlction's ecoflomic development policies.
(1) Target tax/ financdal subsidies for economic develoflmen t more carefd/y. Because tax land financial subsldies for economics development are expensive per job, created, they should be used r-r/ore thoughtfully then they are at present. Such expensive subsidies bake more sense for high unemployment areas. Because the unemplbyed are more desperate for jobs in thigh unemployment areas, even ,expensive subsidies may have benefitg exceeding costs. In low unemployment areas, many persons obtaining1 jobs because of an economic developlment program could have obtainled jobs anyway. Adding jobs in a boom area wtll also require expensive lnew infrastructure. The high costs of ~subsidizing new jobs may not be tiorth it in low unemployment, fast ~growing areas. Tax and financial Pubsidies for new jobs rnak.e more s nse if the jobs pay a high wage pre x ium, that is, they pay well relative t# the skills required. High-wag -premium jobs will provide more desi t able jobs for local residents. In addit on, higher-wage jobs will have greater multiplier effec:ts on the local Ieconomy, as the higher wages lead to a greater boost to local consumer1demand.8 (2) (3) Tax and financial subsidies should have rules to guide when subsidies are to be given and their amount. For example, the rules might increase the subsidy for a higher-wage plant that employs more local residents. Without rules, political pressures may lead to excessive subsidies for large projects.
Economic development policies should place more emphasis on improving business productivity. Because research suggests that economic development services to improve business productivity can be effective, state and local governments should place more emphasis on this area. More effort should be devoted to programs to train entrepreneurs, provide advice to small and medium-sized businesses, and help small and medium-sized businesses with worker training. Such programs may be more cost-effective than tax subsidies to large companies, even if they do not allow for high-publicity ribbon cuttings. These productivity-related services to business should be regularly evaluated, by surveys of business clients and comparisons of assisted and unassisted firms, to monitor their effectiveness and suggest program improvements. Program managers should focus these programs on filling gaps where private markets have problems providing information for improving productivity. Where possible, fees should be charged business clients to partially cover the cost of these services: this stretches limited public dollars and shows whether these services are valued.
Metropolitan cooperation in economic development programs is essential. Competition for jobs among jurisdictions within the same metropolitan area uses public resources without changing overall labor market opportunities in the metropolitan area. A metropolitan area is one labor market. If the goal of economic development policy is to improve labor market opportunities, economic development should be coordinated within a labor market area.
To: President Clinton. Re: two things you can do to improve the effectiveness of government economic development efforts.
Use limited federal resources to expand and standardize evaluations of economic development programs. Because of the budget deficit, the federal government is unlikely to devote sufficrent resources to economic development services to make a significant different in the overall United States economy. Furthermore, there is some evidence that locally controlled economic development services are more effective. With limited federal dollars, it would be more effective to encourage improvements in the quality of local economic development programs, particularly economic development programs that improve productivity. Local governments lack sufficient incentive to support evaluations. The benefits of high-quality evaluation accrue to governments around the nation, not just the government conducting the evaluation. Federal fundrng should support evaluations of state and local economic development programs, and support disseminating the results of such evaluations. Evaluations would be more useful if they were done similarly for different states and cities, so that the effectiveness of different programs could be compared. Standardization of out national leadership and funding. One first step would be to develop a standard survey form for business clients of economic development programs.
(2) The national interest would be served by discouraging state and local governments /n areas with low unemployment rates and booming economies from providing large finanaal and tax subsidies for economic devekbpment. Political pressures lead to large tax subsidies and financial subsidies for large companies making location decisions. In low unemployment areas, the local employment benefits ,from these subsidies are more than offset by the losses to high unernployment areas that do not succeed in attracting the large company. It is undesirable to eliminate all economic development programs, because some of these programs help promote business productivity. It also is undesirable to prevent high unemployment areas like Detroit from competing for new business. What we should try to do is discourage low unemployment, prosperous areas from offering excessive financial subsidies to new business. It is infeasible to elrminate all financial subsidies for economic development, given the many thousands of jurisdictions and companies involved in such subsidy programs and the enormous political pressures encouraging such subsidies. What rnay be desirable and feasible is to limit-not eliminate--the types of subsidies provided to a few large companies. For new plant location decisions or expansion decisions that exceed some number of workers or dollar amount of investment, federal community development block grant assistance or industrial development bond authority c9yld be reduced if an area provides unproductive" subsidies to affect that location or expansion decisioh. The penalty for providing such supsidies would be greater for low ufiemployment areas. "Unproductive" sr bsidies would be defined as discretilonary subsidies provided to one fikm that would not have any perman t nt effect on the local economy if the firm leaves. Under this definitioni a tax abatement or free land for a 'company would be an "unproductive" subsidy. On the other hand, building a new access road or training a firm's workers would not be conFidered an unproductive subsidy, bbcause some benefit from this spending would still continue if the fir& left the area. A proposal similar td this was reportedly included in an early draft of Vice President Gofie's Reinventing Government Task Force on the Commerce Department. Such a proposal r$ght be welcomed by many governor/; and mayors. This limited federal intervention would enable more state? and cities to resist the political priessures of trying to claim credit, by using large subsidies, for large companies' location or expansion decisions. IThe limitation of such subsidies wovld free up some state and local resDurces for more productive approaqhes to economic development, whelher through productivity-oriented qconomic development programs, ghneral improvements in public services, or general tax reductions. Finally, this approach would still give co' siderable latitude to high unemploy 8 ent areas to help create new jobs f& local residents.
AFTERWORD: COMME TS ON COURANT'S PERSPECTI E Although this might not be apparent to some readers, Paul Coyrant and I are in general agreement in our perspective on local economic development policy. Both of us emphasize that policymakers and researchers should spend more time thinking about and measuring the u/t;-mate benefits of local economic development policy. Policymakers and researchers need to focus on the benefits of such programs for the unemployed, different groups of workers, the local fiscal situation, and the productivity of the local economy. Job creation in and of itself should not be seen as the ultimate goal of economic development programs.
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' Using economic jargon, In high unemployment areas the gap between wages actually paid and the "reservation wage" of the unemployed will be greater. The "reservation wage" of an Individual IS the lowest wage for which that Individual would be willing to work.
Whether national job growth on net goes up or down is a complicated issue. If local governments compete by subsldizlng labor demand, and national labor supply IS not completely inelastic, a partial equillbnum analysis would lead us to expect some increase in equilibrium national employment.
Whether a general equilibrium analysis would also make such a prediction depends on the macroeconomic model used Furthermore, as Courant points out, most local development subsidies are nominally subsidies to capital. But because the subsidies are conditioned on the number and quality of jobs provided, they also have some of the character of a labor demand subsidy.
From an economic efficiency perspective, these Increases in local land prices and other local prices are a transfer of resources between different groups, and do not represent a net gain for society.
Where Courant and I differ is my greater emphasis on the value of research on the costs and effectiveness of economic development programs in creating jobs and enhancing productivity. Although there is uncertainty in current research, I would argue that we do know some useful things: tax incentives for economic development are not selffinancing, but have significant costs per job created; some programs that promote productivity appear to be effective. We need to continue this line of research. Even as we learn more about the labor market and fiscal effects of job growth, we will need to have more precise information about how different economic development programs in different cities affect job growth. Furthermore, we need much more research on the "new wave" economic development programs, which seek to promote business productivity. Can such programs play a significant role in increasing the competitiveness of American industries? How can such programs be best designed? The answers to such questions may be important to the long-term performance of the United States economy.
ENDNOTES
I appreciate the helpful comments of Joel Slemrod, Randy Eberts, Paul Courant, and George Erickcek on earlier versions of this paFormally, suppose unemployed workers In city X have benefit Wfrom getting a job and moving costs M from moving to get one. We reduce a typical firm's profit by D by inducing them to create one more Job in city X If workers have full InformatIon, M must exceed W, and no subsidy can be efficient. But it is possible that W can exceed D, and a subsidy for firm Job creation may be efficient. Some economists will argue that workers and firms on their own should be able to make such a deal to create jobs. In an imperfect world, however, government may sometimes be the best available mechanism to reach such deals.
These elasticity estimates combine studies that look at business taxes with studies that look at overall taxes. Elasticity estimates do not seem to depend on the tax measure. It is reasonable to assume that the effects estimated for overall taxes are attributable to the business taxes Included in that overall tax measure.
These elasticity estimates also combine results from studies that use different measures of business activity, for example total local employment, gross state product, and plant starts These differences in dependent variable do not lead to systematic differences
In estimated tax effects, so I refer in the text simply to effects on local business activity.
The calculation IS as follows. The tax elastlclty
